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Abstract. The interlink between information and belief formation and
revision is a fundamental aspect of social dynamics. The growth of knowl-
edge fostered by a hyper-connected world together with the unprece-
dented acceleration of scientific progress has exposed individuals, gov-
ernments and countries to an increasing level of complexity to explain
reality and its phenomena. Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about the so
called collective intelligence, conspiracy theories and other unsubstanti-
ated claims find on the Web a natural medium for their diffusion. Cases
in which these kinds of false information are used in political debates
are far from unimaginable. In this work, we study the behavior of users
supporting different (and opposite) worldviews – i.e. scientific and con-
spiracist thinking – that commented the posts of the Facebook page
of a large italian political party that advocates direct democracy and
e-Participation. We find that users supporting different narratives con-
sume political information in a similar way. Moreover, by analyzing the
composition of users active on the page in terms of commenting activity,
we notice that almost one fifth of them is represented by polarized con-
sumers of conspiracy stories, and those are able to generate almost one
third of total comments to the posts of the page.
Keywords: misinformation, collective narratives, crowd dynamics, in-
formation spreading.
1 Introduction
In the past few years an impressive research effort has been devoted to definition
of theoretical and pragmatical implications of e-Participation [1–6]. However, not
much is known about the peculiarity of users content selection when dealing with
critical issues such as collective decisions. The Web has become pervasive and
digital technology permeates every aspect of daily life. Social interaction, health-
care activity, political engagement and economic decision-making are influenced
by digital hyper-connectivity – i.e. the increasing and exponential rate at which
people, processes and data become connected [7–14]. In particular, people per-
ceptions, knowledge, beliefs, and opinions about the world and its evolution
get (in)formed and modulated through the information they can access, most
of which coming from newspapers, television, and, more recently, the Internet
– where the passage from hierarchical information structures (one to many)
to complex networks (many to many) changed information spreading patterns.
Nowadays, everyone can produce and access a variety of information actively par-
ticipating in the diffusion and reinforcement of narratives. Such a process has
been enthusiastically dubbed as collective intelligence [15, 16], and this kind of
disintermediation had a profound impact on individuals, governments and coun-
tries, by offering huge social and economic gains and, at the same time, present-
ing new governance and assurance challenges [17–24]. Despite the enthusiastic
rhetoric about the ways in which digital technologies have burst the interest in
debating political or social relevant issues, and the obvious and well-documented
benefits of a hyper-connected world – the role of the World Wide Web in en-
forcing informed debates and their effects on the public opinion still remain
unclear, and the rapid viral spread of information that is either intentionally or
unintentionally misleading or provocative could have serious consequences. For
these reasons, the World Economic Forum listed massive digital misinformation
as one of the main risks for the modern society [25]. The increasing growth of
knowledge fostered by a hyper-connected world together with the unprecedented
acceleration of the scientific progress has exposed society to an increasing level
of complexity to explain reality and its phenomena. In fact, conspiracy theories
as alternative explanations to complex phenomena (e.g. globalization) find on
the Web a natural medium for their dissemination and, not rarely, they are used
as argumentation for policy making and foment collective debates. Conspiracists
tend to reduce the complexity of reality by explaining significant social or po-
litical aspects as plots conceived by powerful individuals or organizations. As
these kinds of arguments can sometimes involve the rejection of science, alter-
native explanations are invoked to replace the scientific evidence. For instance,
people who reject the link between HIV and AIDS generally believe that AIDS
was created by the U.S. Government to control the African American popula-
tion [26]. Cases in which these kinds of false information feed into an existing
worldview, making it harder to dislodge, are far from unimaginable – especially
in online social networks where information is less publicly visible, like friends’
networks or communities supporting specific narratives on Facebook. The spread
of misinformation in such trusted networks can be particularly difficult to correct
[27–30]. Since unsubstantiated claims are proliferating over the Internet, what
would happen if they were used as the basis for policy making? What would
happen if the discussion about critical issues such as vaccination or economic
strategies were grounded over incorrect or false information? Moreover, while it
is certainly possible for unsubstantiated claims to spread accidentally, it is also
possible for misinformation to be deliberately propagated by those who stand
to reap some kind of benefit. Such a scenario makes crucial the quantitative
understanding (and beyond pure speculation or experiment on small groups)
of the relationships within content selection, information consumption, and be-
liefs formation and revision. In fact, a recent work [31] showed that on the web
unsubstantiated claims reverberate as long as other kind of information and in
[32] the authors have studied the consumption patterns on Facebook of 1.2 mil-
lion of individuals supporting different (and opposite) worldviews – i.e. scientific
and conspiracist thinking – confirming the hypothesis of cognitive closure for
conspiracists, i.e. their attitude to avoid profound scrutiny of evidence in front
a given matter of fact. Moreover, in the same study, it has been analyzed the
response of the social system to 4,709 intentional false claims with a satirical
taste, finding that users mainly consuming conspiracist news are the one more
prone to respond with a positive feedback. In this work, we provide an extension
of the previous mentioned studies by analyzing the consumption patterns of 1.2
million of individuals on the Facebook page of a large italian political party that
advocates direct democracy and e-Participation, for which we downloaded all
the posts and the related users’ interactions for a timespan of 4 years (2010 to
2014). In particular, we first aim at confirming that users supporting different
(and opposite) narratives consume politics-related information in a similar way;
we then study the composition of users and their commenting activity on the
political page. We show that a large number of users interacting with the on-
line political movement is composed by users that usually consume conspiracist
news, which has been shown to be less critical in diffusing false information [31].
Such a result raises a warning about the current practices to be addressed for
the e-Participation research.
2 Data Collection
The debate around relevant social issues spreads and persists over the Web, lead-
ing to the emergence of unprecedented social phenomena such as the massive
recruitment of people around common interests, ideas or political visions. We
defined the space of our investigation with the help of Facebook groups very
active in the debunking of conspiracy theses. The resulting dataset is composed
of 73 public pages categorized in scientific and conspiracist news for which we
downloaded all the posts (and their respective users’ interactions) for a times-
pan of 4 years (2010 to 2014). The exact breakdown of the data is presented
in Table 1. The first category includes all pages diffusing conspiracist and al-
ternative information – pages which disseminate controversial information, most
often lacking supporting evidence and sometimes contradictory of the official
news. The second category is that of scientific dissemination including scien-
tific institutions and scientific press having the main mission to diffuse scientific
knowledge. Notice that it is not our intention claiming that conspiracist and
alternative information are necessarily false. Our focus is on how communities
formed around different information and worldviews consume information. We
focus our analysis on the interaction of users with the public posts – i.e. likes,
shares, and comments. Each of these actions has a particular meaning. A like
stands for a positive feedback to the post; a share expresses the will to increase
the visibility of a given information; and comment is the way in which online col-
lective debates take form. Comments may contain negative or positive feedbacks
with respect to the post.
Total Science Conspiracy
Pages 73 34 39
Posts 271, 296 62, 705 208, 591
Likes 9, 164, 781 2, 505, 399 6, 659, 382
Comments 1, 017, 509 180, 918 836, 591
Commenters 279, 972 53, 438 226, 534
Likers 1, 196, 404 332, 357 864, 047
Table 1. Breakdown of Facebook dataset. The number of pages, posts, comments,
and likes for scientific and conspiracist pages.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Different narratives, consumption patterns and polarized users
Fruition of contents related to different (and opposite) narratives – i.e. scientific
and conspiracy thinking – has been investigated on a sample of 1.2 million of
individuals consuming information in a timespan of 4 years by liking, comment-
ing, and sharing posts of Facebook pages supporting different worldviews [32].
Figure 1 shows the empirical Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF)5 for likes, that in the vast majority of the times are intended as positive
feedbacks to the posts; comments, the way in which online collective debates take
form; and shares, intended as the will to increase the visibility of a given infor-
mation. In spite of the diverse nature of the information, posts are consumed in
a similar way.
5 We remind that the CCDF of a random variable X is the function f(x) = Pr(X > x).
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Fig. 1. Consumption patterns. Empirical Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function (CCDF) of users’ activities (likes, comments and shares) on posts grouped by
page category. The distributions are indicating similar consumption patterns for pages
supporting different worldviews.
However, by a correlation analysis on the combinations of interactions it
has been shown that posts on conspiracy pages are more likely to receive likes
and shares. Such a result indicates a strong attitude of conspiracy users toward
dissemination.
To identify communities and their consumption patterns with respect to the
information both in favor and against their system of beliefs, users have been
labeled as polarized in one community or the other through a simple thresholding
algorithm. In particular, a user has been defined as polarized in science if more
than 95% of his/her likes were on posts of pages supporting scientific thinking;
conversely, a user has been defined as polarized in conspiracy if more than 95%
of his/her likes were on posts of pages supporting conspiracist thinking.
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Fig. 2. Consumption patterns of polarized users. Empirical Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of polarized users’ activities (likes and com-
ments). Both distributions are indicating similar consumption patterns for users po-
larized in different communities.
The thresholding algorithm labeled 255,225 users polarized in science and
790,899 users polarized in conspiracy. By looking at the commenting activity
of polarized users both inside and outside their community, we find that users
polarized in conspiracy tend to interact mainly in their community both in terms
of comments and likes; conversely, users polarized in science appear to act slightly
more outside their community. Furthermore, despite the diverse nature of the
information, consumption patterns by users polarized in different communities
are similar. Figure 2 shows that the interaction with posts by users polarized in
different communities is quite similar both in terms of likes and comments.
3.2 Narratives and credulity
In [31] it has been shown that users who engage with debates on posts of conspir-
acist pages are much more likely to engage with debates on posts of intentional
false news posted by troll pages – i.e. satirical and paradoxical imitations of
conspiracist information sources.
One of the most popular memes that spreads an intentional false information
reads (in text form): Italian Senate voted and accepted (257 in favor and 165
abstentions) a law proposed by Senator Cirenga aimed at funding with 134 billion
Euros the policy-makers to find a job in case of defeat in the political competition.
This meme contains at least four false statements: the name of the senator, the
total number of votes (higher than possible), the amount of money (more than
10% of Italian GDP), and the law itself. It was created by a troll page and,
on the wave of public discontent against italian policy-makers, quickly became
viral, obtaining about 35,000 shares in less than one month. Shortly thereafter,
the image was downloaded and reposted (with the addition of a commentary)
by a page describing itself as being focused on political debate. Nowadays, this
meme is among the arguments used by protesters manifesting in several Italian
cities.
In [32] the authors have stressed out the critical aspect of contents fruition on
Facebook – i.e. how the credulity on online social networks fosters misinformation
diffusion – by investigating the way in which polarized users of different (and
opposite) narratives interacted with 4,709 intentional false information – e.g.
the undisclosed news that infinite energy has been finally discovered, or that a
new lamp made of actinides (plutonium and uranium) might solve problems of
energy gathering with less impact on the environment, or that a chemical analysis
revealed that chem-trails contains sildenafil citratum (the active component of
ViagraTM).
comments likes
User affiliation
3959
users
labeled
3888
users 
labeled
science
conspiracy
Fig. 3. Polarized users on intentional false information. Percentage of likes and
comments by polarized users of the two communities on intentional false information
posted by a troll page – i.e. a caricatural and satirical version of a conspiracist page.
Users polarized in science aim at inhibiting the diffusion of false claims through their
commenting activity, whereas users polarized in conspiracy aim at liking (approving)
what manipulated main stream information sources are neglecting.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of likes and comments by polarized users
of the two communities on intentional false memes posted by a troll page –
i.e. a caricatural and satirical version of a conspiracist page. Polarized users of
both categories retain their consumption patterns. Users polarized in conspiracist
pages are more active in liking and commenting.
3.3 Narratives and online political activism
Here we analyze the interaction of polarized users with politics-related infor-
mation on Facebook. We look at the interaction with posts published on the
Facebook page of a large italian political political movement that advocates di-
rect democracy and e-Participation as the new paradigm for policy making. This
movement supports anti-particracy and promotes the direct participation of cit-
izens in the management of public affairs through forms of digital democracy,
describing itself as a democratic encounter outside of party and associative ties
and without the mediation of directive or representational organisms, recognizing
to all users of the Internet the role of government and direction that is normally
attributed to a few [33].
We downloaded all the posts (15,628) and the related comments (3,140,573)
in a timespan of 4 years (2010 to 2014).
comments per user
Em
pi
ric
al
 C
CD
F
100 101 102
10
−
4
10
−
3
10
−
2
10
−
1
10
0
l
l
l
l l l llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
science
conspiracy
Fig. 4. Commenting activity of polarized users. Empirical Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of comments on the political page by users
polarized in science and conspiracy. The distributions are indicating a similar com-
menting activity for users polarized in different communities.
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Fig. 5. Polarized users and politics. Percentage of users polarized in science and
conspiracy that commented on the political page. Users polarized in science that com-
mented on the political page were 15,596 (6.11%), whereas users polarized in conspiracy
that interacted with the political page in terms of comments were 93,579 (11.83%) –
i.e., in terms of commenting activity, users polarized in conspiracy are almost twice
active than users polarized in science.
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Composition of active users
per commenting activity
Fig. 6. Composition of active users per commenting activity. Percentage of
users polarized in the two communities – i.e. scientific and conspiracist thinking – that
are active, in terms of commenting activity, on the Facebook page of a large italian
political party that advocates direct democracy and e-Participation. We notice that
almost one fifth (19.07%) of the active users per commenting activity is represented by
users polarized in conspiracy.
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Fig. 7. Commenting activity of polarized users. Percentage of comments by users
polarized in the two communities – i.e. scientific and conspiracist thinking – on the
Facebook page of a large italian political party that advocates direct democracy and
e-Participation. We notice that almost one third (27.13%) of total comments comes
from users polarized in conspiracy.
Figure 4 shows the empirical Complementary Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CCDF) of comments on the political page by users polarized in science
and conspiracy. The distributions are indicating a similar commenting activity
for users supporting different (and opposite) narratives. Such a result confirms
the findings of [32].
Figure 5 shows the percentage of users polarized in science and conspiracy
that commented on the political page. We notice that 15,596 users polarized in
science (6.11%) commented on the political page, whereas users polarized in con-
spiracy that interacted with the political page in terms of comments are 93,579
(11.83%) – i.e., in terms of commenting activity, users polarized in conspiracy
are almost twice active than users polarized in science.
Figure 6 shows the composition of users active on the political page. We are
able to identify 490,600 active users per commenting activity, whereof 15,596
(3.18%) are users polarized in science and 93,579 (19.07%) are users polarized
in conspiracy. In other words, almost one fifth of active users per commenting
activity on the Facebook page of a large italian political party that advocates
direct democracy and e-Participation is represented by users polarized on con-
spiracy – i.e. those users that are more inclined to engage with debates and
like (approve) posts raising concern on intentional false information. Figure 7
shows the composition of comments on the political page. Total comments are
3,140,573, whereof 99,188 (3.16%) are from users polarized in science and 851,912
(27.13%) are from users polarized in conspiracy. Such a result is indicating that
almost one third of comments (the way in which online collective debates take
form) on the Facebook page of a large italian political party comes from users
polarized in conspiracy – i.e. those users that are more likely to comment and
like (approve) unsubstantiated claims and posts raising concern on intentional
false information with a satirical taste.
4 Conclusions
A recent work [31] has shown that on the web unsubstantiated claims rever-
berate as long as those grounded on more verified information, and that usual
consumers of conspiracy theories are more prone to jump the credulity barrier.
In particular, conspiracy theories find on the web a natural medium for their
diffusion and, not rarely, trigger collective counter-conspirational actions. Nar-
ratives grounded on conspiracy theories tend to reduce the complexity of reality
and are able to contain the uncertainty they generate. Along this path, in [32] it
has been studied how 1.2 million of Facebook users consume information related
to different (and opposite) narratives – i.e. scientific and conspiracist thinking.
In particular, after having labeled users as polarized in science and polarized
in conspiracy by means of a thresholding algorithm, it has been shown that
users polarized in conspiracy are more focused on posts of their community and
more committed to the diffusion of news supporting their narratives, whereas
users polarized in science are more likely to comment on posts of the opposite
community. Such a social dynamics is likely to be led by socio-cognitive rea-
sons. Conspiracists want to diffuse those information that are neglected by main
stream sources, whereas users supporting scientific thinking aim at inhibiting
the diffusion of unsubstantiated claims and the proliferation of narratives based
on conspiracy theories. Moreover, it has been shown how polarized users of both
categories responded to the inoculation of 924 intentional false claims with a
satirical taste, finding that users of both categories seem to not distinguish the
false nature of those information, with users polarized in conspiracy more focused
on liking (approving) and users polarized in science more active on comment-
ing (debating). In this work we extend the previous studies by investigating
how users polarized in both communities consume political news. In particular,
we analyze the consumption by users polarized in science and conspiracy of the
posts on the Facebook page of a large italian political party that advocates direct
democracy and e-Participation, for which we collect all the posts and the related
comments for a timespan of 4 years (2010 to 2014). We first show that users sup-
porting different (and opposite) narratives have similar consumption patterns –
by pointing out a comparable commenting activity for users polarized in science
and conspiracy. Then, through a quantitative analysis on the comments to the
posts of the political page under investigation, we show that users polarized in
conspiracy are a representative fraction of the political discussion in that page.
Moreover, by analyzing the composition of the users active on the political page
in terms of comments, we find that almost one fifth (19.07%) of total active
users is represented by users polarized in conspiracy – i.e. the users that have
been shown to be more likely to jump the credulity barrier once exposed to false
information. Those users polarized in conspiracy that were active on the polit-
ical page were able to generate almost one third (27.13%) of total comments.
What would happen if candidates for the parliament were selected through a
procedure of online voting which selects among online activists?
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